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Abstract: 
There is evidence that experience premium differs across industries. We 
propose a theoretical model for explaining these differences. We assume that 
labor mobility brings external knowledge to the firm, which increases its 
productivity. We find that industry experience premium is decreasing in the 
inter-firm mobility costs, while increasing in the learning-by-doing and the 
technological level of the industry. Moreover, it has a U-shape relationship 
with the level of learning-by-hiring, the substitutability between different 
types of experienced workers and the variety of knowledge in the industry. 
Results are consistent with the empirical findings that R&D-intensive 
industries have steeper wage profiles.  
JEL Classification: J24; J31; J61 
Keywords: labor mobility, industry experience premium, wage growth, 
learning-by-hiring. 
 
Resum: 
Hi ha evidència que l'experiència es remunera diferentment segons la 
indústria. Proposem un model teòric que explica aquestes diferències. 
Suposem que la mobilitat de treballadors aporta coneixement extern a 
l'empresa i això augmenta la seva productivitat. Els resultats mostren que 
l'experiència és millor remunerada en les indústries amb costos de mobilitat 
baixos, amb molt aprenentatge (learning-by-doing) i alt nivell tecnològic. A 
més, trobem una relació en forma de U entre la remuneració de l'experiència i 
el nivell d'absorció de coneixement extern, la substitutibilitat entre diferents 
tipus de treballadors i la varietat de coneixement dins la indústria. Els resultats 
són consistents amb l'evidència que les indústries intensives en I&D 
remuneren millor l'experiència. 
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1. Introduction 
There is evidence that experience premium differs across industries. There are 
two open controversies related to this evidence. The first controversy is about 
which economic theory prevails in explaining wage growth. The second 
controversy refers to the empirical relevance of firm, industry and general 
experience on wage growth. This paper adds to this literature by proposing a 
theoretical explanation for these inter-industry differences in experience 
premium. In our model, the level of labor mobility across firms influences the 
experience premium. Consequently, the determinants of labor mobility affect 
also the experience premium of the industry. 
 
Regarding the first controversy, there are three main theories that explain wage 
growth.1 According to the human capital theory, the wage growth is explained 
by worker's productivity growth, through training or learning-by-doing (Becker 
1962; Altonji and Shakotko 1987). Industries which offer more training should 
provide a steeper wage profile according to this theory. Moreover, human 
capital theory predicts that firm-specific training leads to both, a steeper wage 
profile and lower labor mobility. (Lazear 1981) proposes a second theory, the 
delayed compensation theory. He argues that firms postpone part of the payment 
to motivate workers to work hard in the first period. In this case, we would 
observe steeper profiles in those industries where worker's effort is less 
observable. Third, and within the matching theory, incomplete information on 
worker's productivity may explain why wages grow with tenure (Jovanovic 
1979). In this case, wage growth is purely a result of the quality of matching. All 
of these theories predict that workers who are offered a steeper wage profile 
should be less likely to leave the firm. We add an alternative theory to this 
controversy. Although our paper conforms with the human capital theory, since 
                                                
1 For some examples of papers testing these theories see Abraham, K. G. and H. S. Farber 
(1987), Altonji, J. G. and R. A. Shakotko (1987), Brown, J. N. and G. S. Becker (1989), 
Barth, E. (1997).  
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wage growth comes from an increase in worker's productivity, we propose a 
model where it is compatible to have a steep wage profile and a high level of 
labor mobility. Our results are consistent with the evidence found in (Levine 
1993) that establishments with high returns to tenure do not have low levels of 
labor turnover. 
 
The second controversy is about the empirical relevance of firm, industry and 
general experience on wage growth. There is a handful of empirical studies 
showing that differences in returns to industry tenure exist. (Neal 1995) and 
(Parent 2000) give evidence that workers receive compensation for industry-
specific skills instead of firm-specific skills. According to their results, worker's 
experience in an industry and not firm tenure matters for the wage profile. Using 
German data (Dustmann and Meghir 2005) find that returns to industry tenure 
are 1% per year for skilled workers and zero for the unskilled. They also find, 
however, that general experience pays substantially more to skilled workers, 
while firm tenure provides high returns to unskilled workers. (Allen 2001) 
shows that wage growth varies across industries. This is the only paper we are 
aware of that explicitly allows for differences in wage growth across industries. 
One of his results is that R&D-intensive industries have steeper wage profiles 
than industries with little R&D activity. Our model is consistent with this result 
and proposes some other industry characteristics that should be taken into 
account when studying wage growth. 
 
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we provide a theory on 
differences in wage growth across industries. New industry characteristics are 
introduced that had not been considered in the literature, namely learning-by-
hiring, mobility costs, learning-by-doing, variety of knowledge and 
complementarity of experienced workers. And second, we propose an 
alternative way of modeling inter-firm labor mobility within the neoclassical 
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framework, which leads to an extended Total Factor Productivity. In particular, 
we obtain that the TFP depends on the technological level, the learning-by-doing 
and the composition of labor within the firm. 
 
We represent an industry by a small open economy. We solve first for the 
industry equilibrium and then perform a comparative static analysis to get the 
inter-industry results. There are four main assumptions in our model. First, 
markets are competitive, so workers are paid their marginal productivity. 
Second, there is labor market segmentation in the sense that each industry has a 
fixed supply of labor. One may think of individuals having strong tastes on 
which industry to work in, or industries requiring specific workers' 
characteristics (Dickens and Lang 1988). Although this is a strong assumption, it 
allows us to model labor mobility while still having a tractable model. Third, 
and most importantly, it is assumed that mobility of workers within an industry 
induces knowledge diffusion. That is, workers have embodied knowledge and 
when they move between firms their knowledge travels with them. Evidence on 
the transfer of knowledge through labor mobility (learning-by-hiring) refers 
especially to the mobility of technical or R&D personnel in high-tech or R&D 
intensive industries (Saxenian 1994, Zucker, Darby et al. 1998, Almeida and 
Kogut 1999). In our model only experienced workers may have incentives to 
move between firms. Finally, we assume that heterogeneity of knowledge brings 
extra productivity to the firm. There is evidence that innovation comes easier 
when there is exchange of knowledge among scientists, technicians or 
researchers in general (Peri 2005, Leonard and Sensiper 1998, Ettlie 1980, 
Sakakibara 1997). Different points of view or different expertises together may 
innovate faster than a homogeneous group of workers. Furthermore, the latter 
literature emphasizes tacit knowledge, which requires face-to-face contact 
among individuals. We introduce this observation in our model by assuming that 
workers can exchange knowledge only within the firm. 
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Our model gives two main predictions about the inter-industry experience 
premium, which had not been obtained yet from any theoretical model. First, we 
find that industries with either low or high learning-by-hiring, narrow or wide 
variety of knowledge and strong or weak complementarity between experienced 
workers reward better industry tenure than industries with intermediate levels of 
these variables. Second, we obtain that industries with lower mobility costs, 
larger learning-by-doing and higher technological level give a steeper wage 
profile to their workers. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section develops a model of 
an industry with labor mobility and knowledge diffusion. Section 3 describes the 
symmetric equilibrium. In section 4 results are presented. First, the solution for 
the case of zero mobility costs is computed. Afterwards, the comparative static 
analysis with positive mobility costs is analyzed. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
Consider an industry represented by a small open economy. Agents can borrow 
or lend money at an exogenous interest rate . tr Let tF  be the number of firms in 
the industry each period. Firms are identical in everything except that each of 
them has a different type of knowledge. Labor markets are segmented in the 
sense that there is a fixed supply of labor per industry.  
 
Workers live for two periods and each generation has a measure tN  of 
individuals ready to work in a particular industry. When individuals are young 
they work in a firm as unexperienced workers. By working in the firm they learn 
the specific knowledge of that firm without any cost (learning-by-doing), so 
that, at the beginning of the next period, there is a positive amount of senior 
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workers with the knowledge developed in each firm. We call them experienced 
workers. 
 
In each period firms may hire their own experienced workers and external 
experienced workers. Denote by jitλ  the amount of experienced workers from 
firm j that are hired by firm i at period ,  t j i≠ . As already stated above, they 
have embodied knowledge type j . We call them poached workers. Similarly, let 
itη  be the amount of own experienced workers hired by the same firm i  at 
period t , which have knowledge type i . We call them retained workers. 
 
The production function of each firm is (1 )( )it it it t itY H K B L
α β α β− −=  where itH  is a 
measure of effective units of human capital, itK  is physical capital, tB  is a 
measure of the productivity level of young workers and itL  is the total young 
employment of firm i ( 1,...i F= ). We define human capital as an asymmetric 
CES function on all types of experienced workers hired by the firm. 
 1/[( ) ( ) ] ,jit it it it jt
j i
H A p Aσ σ ση λ
≠
= + ∑  (1.1) 
where jtA  is a measure of the knowledge of the type- j  worker and p  is a 
parameter which lies between 0 and 1 and measures the ability of learning-by-
hiring of the firm.2 
We assume that 1it tA B −> , which means that workers learn while working in the 
firm. We refer to it as learning-by-doing. In contrast, learning-by-hiring refers to 
the ability of a firm to acquire external knowledge through hiring external 
workers (poaching). We consider it may be limited by three main factors: the 
intrinsic characteristics of the knowledge in question (whether it is firm or 
                                                
2 Notice that the asymmetry in the CES function appears because we assume that knowledge 
from own workers ( itA ) is fully accessible by the firm while knowledge from poached 
workers may be less accessible, i.e. [0,1]p∈ . 
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industry-specific); the degree of capacity of firms to acquire such external 
knowledge (concept of absorptive capability of firms developed by (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990)), and finally, the type of environment where firms develop their 
tasks (e.g. institutions, local legal system which may enforce or not clauses not-
to-compete, strongly defend trade secrets, etc.).3 When one or several of these 
factors diminish the potential of learning-by-hiring, the parameter p  will be 
low, and vice versa. 
 
Knowledge in our model has two dimensions: variety and level of knowledge. 
The subindex i  in itA  indicates the type of knowledge (in which firm the worker 
learned his knowledge), while the level of knowledge is indicated by the 
particular value of itA . In general the level of knowledge may be different across 
firms. Variety of knowledge is ensured by assuming that each firm has a 
different type of knowledge. 
 
With such specifications, we obtain a functional form for output similar to the 
one derived in (Romer 1990), but instead of different types of capital goods, we 
have different types of human capital. In the conventional specification, total 
human capital is implicitly defined as being proportional to the sum of all the 
types of human capital, assuming perfect substitutability among them. Instead, 
we allow for some level of complementarity among different types of human 
capital. In our case the elasticity of substitution between different types of 
                                                
3 There is empirical evidence that shows how differences in legal systems influence the rate of 
labor mobility of a region when learning-by-hiring is relevant. Hyde, A. (1998), Gilson, R. J. 
(1999) and Valetta, R. (2002) argue that Silicon Valley was originated in California precisely 
because clauses not-to-compete have weak enforceability in that state. Almeida and Kogut 
(1999) point out at the importance of ``social institutions that support a viable flow of ideas 
within the spatial confines of regional economies'' for creating the externalities that foster 
innovation (p.916). 
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experienced workers is 1
1 σ− . We assume that they are imperfect substitutes, 
that is,0 1σ< < .4 The output is given by: 
 1[( ) ( ) ] ( ) .jit it it it jt it t it
j i
Y A p A K B L
α
σ σ β α βση λ − −
≠
= + ∑  (1.2) 
We assume decreasing returns to each input($0 1α< < , 0 1β< <  and 1)α β+ < . 
The parameter tB  converts raw quantities of unexperienced labor into efficiency 
units. We assume it is the same for all firms, which means that all young 
workers have the same level of education when entering the industry. Notice 
that even though the production function has constant returns to scale, the 
number of firms matters because it determines the variety of knowledge in the 
economy. Moreover, we assume that without workers there is no access to 
knowledge. 
 
Notice also that the CES functional form of the human capital measure ensures 
that firm productivity is increasing with the variety of knowledge. The 
interpretation is that exchange of knowledge matters for productivity. We allow 
for the interaction of knowledge to happen only when two workers work in the 
same firm, which is coherent with the idea that tacit knowledge is important for 
innovation and needs face-to-face contact to be transmitted. 
 
We assume perfect competition in the product market in order to isolate the 
exchange of knowledge effect in the labor market. To simplify we assume that 
all firms can sell all the product at a given price, which we normalize to 1. 
 
At the beginning of each period there is a measure , 1i tL −  of experienced workers 
for each type of knowledge in the industry ( 1,...i F= ). Moreover, there is a 
                                                
4 Note that the production function evaluated at 0σ =  is not well-defined and the Cobb-
Douglas function cannot be derived. 
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positive cost for workers to move from one firm to the other, which we denote 
by m . It may include the real cost of changing the place of residence as well as 
the subjective cost associated to it. 
 
We consider the case of perfect competition in the labor market, so that firms 
take wages as given. Let itw  be the wage of young workers and itω  the wage of 
type i  experienced workers paid by firm i  in period t . Notice that the wage of 
experienced workers itω  has to be greater than itw  to induce experienced 
workers to work. Otherwise they would prefer to work as unexperienced ones. 
 
Let ijtω  be the wage paid by a firm j  to the experienced workers type i . For this 
type of workers to move to firm j , they must be paid at least as much as in firm 
i  plus the mobility costs, that is, ijt it mω ω≥ + . Since the labor market is perfectly 
competitive, the former condition holds with equality in equilibrium and an 
experienced worker is indifferent between moving or staying. In such a case we 
assume that workers are willing to change the firm. 
 
Each firm i  decides the amount itη  of own experienced workers to retain, the 
amount jitλ  of experienced workers to poach from each firm j  ( j i≠ ), the 
amount of young workers to hire itL  and the amount of physical capital itK  to 
rent. We assume full depreciation of physical capital. 
 
The problem of the firm is to maximize the discounted sum of future profits. In 
our specification each period is independent from each other. In particular we 
assume that the technological parameters itA  and tB  are exogenous and do not 
depend on firm decisions. Then the firm's problem can be expressed as a period 
by period maximization. 
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Given the competitive wages itw , jtω  and jitω  such that jit jt mω ω≥ +  and iit twω ≥ , 
the problem of the firm is the following: 
 
1
, , ,
max (( ) ( ) ) ( )
                              .
j
it it it it
j
it it it jt it t it
L K j i
i j j
t it it it it it t it
j i
A p A K B L
w L R K
α
σ σ β α βσ
η λ
η λ
ω η ω λ
− −
≠
≠
+ −
− − − −
∑
∑  
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
 
1 1
1
( )
(( ) ( ) )
it it it t it
it
j
it it it jt
j i
A K B L
A p A
σ σ β α β
α
σ σ σ
αη ω
η λ
− − −
−
≠
=
+ ∑
, (1.3) 
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( )
(( ) ( ) ) ( )
jt it t it
jt
s j
it it it st it
s i
p A K B L
m j i
A p A
σ β α β
α
σ σ σσ
α ω
η λ λ
− −
−−
≠
= + ∀ ≠
+ ∑
, (1.4) 
 1(1 )(( ) ( ) )j iit it it jt it t it t
j i
A p A K B L w
α
σ σ β α β α βσα β η λ − − − −
≠
− − + =∑ , (1.5) 
 
 1 1(( ) ( ) ) ( )jit it it jt it t it t
j i
A p A K B L R
α
σ σ β α βσβ η λ − − −
≠
+ =∑ . (1.6) 
Equations (3), (4) and (5) equalize marginal productivity to the marginal cost of 
retained workers, poached workers and young workers, respectively. Notice that 
we already introduce the equilibrium result on wages, jit jt mω ω= + . Similarly, 
equation (6) sets marginal productivity of physical capital to the marginal cost, 
which is the rental payment tR . In equilibrium it must happen that the rental rate 
equals the interest rate plus the depreciation rate ( 1t tR r= + ) in order to ensure 
no arbitrage possibilities in the economy. Notice that since marginal 
productivity of poached workers at 0jitλ =  is infinity for all i , j  (see equation 4) 
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and there is no cost of adapting variety of knowledge, all firms poach workers 
from all the other firms in the industry to access the whole range of knowledge.5 
Moreover, firms always want to retain some of their own workers because the 
marginal productivity of retained workers when the industry retains zero 
workers is infinite (see equation 3).6 
 
Since individual labor supply is inelastic, individuals only care about 
maximizing their life-time income, which depends on which firm they start 
working. In equilibrium it must happen that all workers within an industry have 
the same life-time income in present value.  
 , 1, 1
1 1
, .
1 1
j ti t
it jt
t t
w w i j
r r
ωω ++
+ +
+ = + ∀ ≠+ +  (1.7) 
Notice that although an experienced worker type i  poached by firm j  
earns ijt it mω ω= + , he incurs a cost m  by moving, so the total disposable income 
reduces to itω . Thus, equation (7) refers to both stayers and movers. 
 
Next we present the market clearing conditions for the labor market. Equation 
(8) refers to the market for young workers and equation (9) to the experienced 
workers' market. 
 
1
F
it t
i
L N
=
=∑ , (1.8) 
                                                
5 We could limit the number of firms from which to poach workers by introducing a cost of 
adaptation of external knowledge which increases with the variety of knowledge. This would 
complicate the analysis without giving any new insights into the model. 
6 These conditions are sufficient but not necessary to obtain positive labor mobility in 
equilibrium. The necessary condition for positive labor mobility is that the marginal 
productivity of the first worker type i  willing to move is lower in her firm of origin than in 
any other firm. Similarly, the condition for having some retained workers in equilibrium is 
that the marginal productivity of the first retained worker is larger than the marginal 
productivity of this type of worker in any other firm when all workers of his type are working 
for that firm. 
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 , 1 1,...
i
jt it i t
j i
L i Fλ η −
≠
+ = ∀ =∑ . (1.9) 
In the left-hand side of equations (8) and (9) there is the total demand for young 
workers and experienced workers type i, respectively. The right-hand side shows 
the total supply of these types of workers. Equations (3) to (9) determine the 
equilibrium of this economy. 
 
3. The symmetric equilibrium 
In a symmetric equilibrium all levels of knowledge are the same across firms, 
although the type of knowledge keeps being different for each firm. In such a 
case it tA A= i∀ . We also assume that there is no population growth neither 
technological growth ( tN , tF , tB  and tA  are constant overtime). Thus, 
hereinafter we suppress the time subscripts. 
 
In a symmetric equilibrium all firms hire the same amount of young workers 
each period. This implies that there is the same amount of experienced workers 
of each type at the beginning of each period ( i
NL
F
= i∀ ). Moreover, also due to 
symmetry, wages are the same for all types of experienced worker. 
 
Definition 1. Given a constant exogenous interest rate r , the symmetric 
equilibrium is characterized by the vector of variables ( , , ,L Kη λ ) and the 
prices ( ,w ω ) that solve the following system of equations: 
 
11 1( ) ( ( 1) ) ,A K BL p F
α
σ α β α β σ σ σαη η λ ω−− − − + − =  (1.10) 
 
11 1( ) ( ( 1) ) ,p A K BL p F m
α
σ α β α β σ σ σαλ η λ ω−− − − + − = +  (1.11) 
 1(1 )( ( 1) ) ,p F A K B L w
α
σ σ α β α β α βσα β η λ − − − −− − + − =  (1.12) 
 1 1( ( 1) ) ( ) 1,p F A K BL r
α
σ σ α β α βσβ η λ − − −+ − = +  (1.13) 
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 ,NL
F
=  (1.14) 
 ( 1) .F Lλ η− + =  (1.15) 
 
Equations (10) to (13) come from the firm's problem and equations (14) and (15) 
are the labor market clearing conditions. Note that equation (7) becomes an 
identity in a symmetric equilibrium. We prove in the appendix that the 
symmetric equilibrium for this economy exists. Moreover, we show that under 
some conditions it is unique. 
 
In the symmetric case we can rewrite the firm production function as: 
 1 1( 1) ,E
E E
AY B p F L K L
B L L
α
σ σα σ
β α β α βη λ− − −⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (1.16) 
where EL  is the total amount of experienced workers in the firm. We obtain a 
standard Cobb-Douglass production function with three inputs: experienced 
labor ( EL ), physical capital ( K ) and young labor ( L ). The non-standard result is 
that the total factor productivity (TFP) is composed of three elements: the 
learning-by-doing, the technological level and the labor composition within the 
firm. A
B
α⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ denotes the learning-by-doing component of the TFP, 
1B β−  denotes 
the technological level and finally ( 1)
E E
p F
L L
α
σ σ ση λ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝
+ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎠ ⎠
⎟⎝ ⎝ ⎠
 describes the 
effect of the firm composition of experienced labor on the TFP. Notice that 
when 1A
B
>  there is learning-by-doing in the industry. Moreover, when A  and 
B  grow in the same proportion, then the learning-by-doing component is not 
affected and the technological level increases. 
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We refer to the industry-specific experience premium as the real wage growth a 
worker experiences in his life. Using equations (10) and (12) we obtain that 
 .
(1 ) 1 ( 1)
L
w
p F
σ
ω α
λα β η η
= ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (1.17) 
The previous equation reveals that all the parameters of the model affect the 
industry experience premium through changes in the composition of the labor 
force within the firm.  
 
4. Results 
Next, we analyze how industries with different levels of learning-by-hiring 
capabilities, different mobility costs, different learning-by-doing possibilities, 
and different initial productivity of workers have different experience premia. 
We first solve analytically for the case of zero mobility costs. Then we simulate 
the model with positive mobility costs and pursue a comparative static analysis 
on the symmetric equilibrium. 
 
4.1 The case of zero mobility costs 
It is useful to obtain the solution of the model for the case of zero mobility costs 
( 0m = ). In such a case, it is possible to obtain an explicit solution for the 
equilibrium. Using equations (10), (11) and (13)-(15) we derive an expression 
forλ , η  and λη .  
 
1
1
1
1
/ ,
1 ( 1)
p N F
F p
σ
σ
λ −
−
=
+ −
  (1.18) 
 1
1
/ ,
1 ( 1)
N F
F p σ
η
−
=
+ −
 (1.19) 
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1
1 .p σλη
−=  (1.20) 
 
We can observe that in absence of mobility costs labor mobility only depends on 
the ability of learning-by-hiring ( p ), the substitutability between different types 
of workers (σ ) and the size of the industry ( N  and F ). Notice that 
technological variables ( A  and B ) do not affect labor mobility in this case. 
Labor mobility is increasing with the learning-by-hiring and decreasing with the 
elasticity of substitution and the variety of knowledge. Obviously, with positive 
mobility costs, the rate of poached workers over retained workers is always 
lower than the value obtained in this section.  
 
It can be proved that in the case of zero mobility costs, the equilibrium amount 
of labor mobility coincides with the amount of labor mobility that maximizes the 
human capital measure ( H ). In contrast, with positive mobility costs, the 
equilibrium labor mobility is below this level, so the human capital measure 
could be increased by increasing labor mobility. It would not be efficient, 
however, since larger labor mobility would also increase the total mobility costs. 
 
To obtain the industry experience premium in the case of zero mobility costs, we 
take equation (17) and substitute η  and λ  by their equilibrium value (equations 
(18) and (19)).  
 .
1w
ω α
α β= − −  (1.21) 
In the equilibrium with zero mobility costs the experience premium only 
depends on the input share of experienced and young workers. Positive mobility 
costs are therefore essential to have an impact of labor mobility on wage growth. 
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4.2 The comparative static analysis with mobility costs 
When mobility costs are positive it is not possible to solve explicitly for the 
equilibrium. We resort to simulation exercises to examine the factors that 
determine experience premium in our model. We provide a formal proof of the 
results for the case (1 )α β σ> −  in the appendix.7 
 
For the simulation we take standard values of the basic parameters. We assume 
each period has 25 years, 0.4α =  and 0.3β = . Since there is no previous 
literature forσ , we take an arbitrary value for the baseline parametrization, 0.5, 
which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution among different types of 
experienced workers of 2. We give arbitrary numbers to the rest of the 
parameters in order to have interior solutions: 100A = , 1B = , 100N =  
and 10F = . We assume a 5% annual interest rate, which corresponds to a 240% 
interest rate in 25 years. Results are robust to changes in the parametrization 
baseline.8 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationships between the parameters of the model and 
the two main variables: labor mobility and experience premium. As expected, all 
the parameters that affect positively the productivity of poached workers induce 
larger labor mobility. The learning-by-doing, the technological level, the variety 
of knowledge and the learning-by-hiring are in this group. In contrast, mobility 
costs and the elasticity of substitution have a negative relationship with labor 
mobility. 
 
                                                
7 We obtain the same qualitative results in all simulations, regardless of having (1 )α β σ> −  
or (1 )α β σ< − . However, the analytical proof for the latter case is weaker since it requires 
additional assumptions. It is available upon request. 
8 Simulation was run for several values of the parameters with no changes in the qualitative 
results. Particular attention was given to check robustness in two cases: when (1 )α β σ> −  
and (1 )α β σ< − . Values for ,  and α β σ  ranged from 0.2 to 0.4, from 0.1 to 0.6 and from 0.1 
to 0.9, respectively. 
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 Figure 1. λη as a function of the industry characteristics. Simulation results. 
Dashed lines show the equilibrium with zero mobility costs. 
 
More surprising are the results on industry experience premium. The dashed 
lines in figure 2 correspond to the experience premium in absence of mobility 
costs. The first thing to be noticed is that the experience premium with positive 
mobility costs is lower than the experience premium with no mobility costs. The 
intuition behind is that larger mobility costs reduce the total demand for 
experienced workers, and thus the experience premium. 
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 Figure 2. Experience premium (
w
ω ) as a function of the industry characteristics. 
Simulation results. Dashed lines show the equilibrium with zero mobility costs. 
 
While the learning-by-doing, the technological level and the mobility costs have 
a monotonic relationship with the experience premium, the other parameters 
under study reveal a non-monotonic relationship. We observe that experience 
premium presents a U-shape relationship with the variety of knowledge, the 
learning-by-hiring and the elasticity of substitution between different types of 
workers.  
 
Equation (17) reveals that most of the effects of the parameters on experience 
premium go through the amount of retained workers (η ) and the relative amount 
of labor mobility ( λη ). Both channels are a measure of the mobility of workers in 
the industry, which is the main determinant of the industry experience premium. 
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An increase in the mobility of workers has two effects on the firm: a larger 
productivity level9 and a larger bill for mobility costs. This creates a trade-off on 
the net productivity of experienced workers. Results on experience premium 
depend on which of these two effects dominates.  
 
To analyze the effect of mobility costs on experience premium recall that an 
increase in mobility costs reduces the amount of labor mobility. This in turn 
provokes a decrease in the human capital measure of the firm and an ambiguous 
effect on the total mobility costs bill. It turns out that the former effect 
dominates and the industry experience premium is decreasing in mobility costs. 
 
The learning-by-doing and the technological level, both affect positively labor 
mobility. This means that an increase in these parameters translates into larger 
productivity (larger H) and a larger bill of mobility costs. We observe, however, 
that the former force dominates. Hence, the experience premium is increasing 
with the learning-by-doing and the technological level. The result that 
experience premium is increasing with the learning-by-doing is consistent with 
the human capital theory, which relates wages to productivity. With regard to 
our parameter on the technological level, Connolly and Gottschalk (2006) show 
that wage growth is more important for more-educated workers. This is 
consistent with our result that experience premium is increasing with B if we 
interpret B as the education level of young workers. 
 
In contrast to the previous results, we obtain a non-monotonous relationship 
when we analyze the variety of knowledge, the learning-by-hiring and the 
elasticity of substitution among different types of experienced workers. An 
increase in learning-by-hiring (p) affects positively the amount of labor 
                                                
9 Recall that with positive mobility costs the optimal amount of labor mobility is below the 
one that maximizes human capital (H). Thus, increasing the equilibrium level of labor 
mobility always increases H. 
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mobility. This implies an increase in the effective measure of human capital and 
a larger mobility costs bill. For low levels of learning-by-hiring the latter force 
dominates and experience premium is decreasing in p. However, as learning-by-
hiring becomes more important, the productivity gain of the increased labor 
mobility compensates for the increase in mobility costs and then experience 
premium is increasing in p.  
 
Similarly, the intuition for a U-shape relationship between variety of knowledge 
and experience premium can be understood by analyzing this trade-off between 
productivity and mobility costs. Recall that we find that variety of knowledge 
increases labor mobility. We obtain that for low values of F, increasing this 
parameter raises mobility costs more than productivity. However, as F is large 
enough, any increase in mobility costs is more than compensated by the increase 
in productivity. This explains the U-shape relationship between experience 
premium and variety of knowledge. 
 
A similar intuition is behind the effect of the elasticity of substitution among 
different types of experienced workers. As different types of workers become 
more substitutable, there is a reduction in labor mobility in equilibrium and 
consequently there is a loss in productivity and a decrease in total mobility costs. 
When complementarieties are very strong, the former effect is larger, thus 
experience premium decreases. However, when the degree of substitutability of 
workers becomes sufficiently large, the loss in productivity is more than 
compensated by the decrease in mobility costs. As a result, the elasticity of 
substitution has a U-shape relationship with the experience premium. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Why do some industries give larger returns to industry experience than others? 
We propose a model where labor mobility across firms affects wage growth in 
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an industry. The determinants of labor mobility within an industry explain then 
the differences in experience premium across industries. We find that experience 
premium is decreasing in mobility costs, while increasing in the learning-by-
doing and the technological level of the industry. Interestingly, wage growth 
presents a U-shape relationship with the learning-by-hiring, the substitutability 
between different types of workers and the variety of knowledge in the industry. 
Additionally to the results on industry experience premium, in the symmetric 
equilibrium we obtain an extended TFP specification. Our extended TFP adds 
two variables to the traditional technological level of the firm. On the one hand, 
the learning-by-doing capability that a firm offers to their workers affects the 
TFP. On the other hand, the firm composition of experienced labor also 
determines firms' TFP. This result suggests that labor mobility may partially 
explain the differences in TFP across countries. 
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Appendix 
A. Proof of the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium 
We first rewrite equations (10)-(15) by introducing two new 
variables:  and Kx k
L
λ
η= = . 
 
1
11 (1 ( 1) ) ,A B k p F x
L
α α
α α β β σ σηα ω
− −− − ⎛ ⎞ + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1.22) 
 
1
11 1 (1 ( 1) ) ,p A B x k p F x m
L
α α
α α β σ β σ σηα ω
− −− − − ⎛ ⎞ + − = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1.23) 
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 1(1 ) (1 ( 1) ) ,A B k p F x w
L
α α
α α β β σ σηα β − − ⎛ ⎞− − + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1.24) 
 1 1 (1 ( 1) ) 1,A B k p F x r
L
α α
α α β β σ σηβ − − − ⎛ ⎞ + − = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1.25) 
 ,NL
F
=  (1.26) 
 ( 1) 1 .LF x η− + =  (1.27) 
Using equation (25) and (27) we obtain k as a function of x. 
 
1
1
1 (1 ( 1) ) .
(1 )(( 1) 1)
A B p F xk
r F x
α βα α β σ σ
α
β −− −⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟+ − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (1.28) 
Using equations (22) and (23) we equalize ω , and substitute k and / Lη  using 
the last equation and equation (27). Then we obtain one equation depending 
only on $x$, which can be written as:  
 
(1 )
(1 )1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1
(1 ) (1 ( 1) )1 .
(1 ( 1) )
m r p F xpx
A B F x
σ β αβ
σ σ ββσ
β α α β α β
β β β βαβ
− −
−−
−
− − − −
− − − −
+ + −= +
+ −
 (1.29) 
Next, we show that such equation has a solution, so the symmetric equilibrium 
exists. Let us denote any solution of equation (29) by *x . Recall that we know 
from solving the model with zero mobility costs that if the equilibrium exists, 
*x must be smaller than
1
1p σ− , and given that [0,1]p∈  and 1σ < , we know 
that * [0,1]x ∈ . Thus, we focus on this region to find the equilibrium. 
 
Since the functions are continuous, to prove that the equilibrium exists it is 
enough to show that  in equation (29) 
( 0) ( 0)LHS x RHS x= > = and ( 1) ( 1)LHS x RHS x= < = . This means that they 
must cross at least once, so the equilibrium exists. At 0x =  the LHS has a 
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vertical asymptote and the RHS is finite. At 1x =  the 1LHS p= <  and it is 
trivial to check that the RHS is larger than 1. Therefore, the equilibrium exists. 
 
Next, we prove uniqueness of equilibrium. The LHS of equation (29) is always 
positive, decreasing in x and convex. 
 2( 1) 0.LHS p x
x
σσ −∂ = − <∂  
 
2
3
2 (1 )(2 ) 0.
LHS p x
x
σσ σ −∂ = − − >∂  
Moreover, it is straight forward to check that the limit of the LHS when x goes 
to zero is infinity and the limit of the LHS when x goes to infinity is zero. 
 
The RHS of equation (29) is always positive and the first derivative is the 
following: 
 
(1 )1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
(1 ) ( 1) (1 ( 1) ) ( ) ,
(1 ) (1 ( 1) )
RHS r F m F px x
x
A B x F x
αβ
σ σ ββ
β α α β α β
β β β ββ α β
−−
− − − − +− − − −
∂ + − + − Ψ= −∂ − + −
 
where  
 ( ) ( (1 ) (1 )( 1)(1 ) ) (1 ).x px F x xσ α β σ β σ α βΨ = − − + − − − + − −  
The slope of the RHS depends on the sign of ( )xΨ . Notice that ( )xΨ  is always 
positive when (1 )α β σ≥ − . On the other hand, when (1 )α β σ< − , it is easy to 
check that ( )xΨ  is negative for all x x<  and positive for x x> , where x  is the 
solution to ( ) 0xΨ = .  
Assumption 
1. * * * *( ) ( (1 ) (1 )( 1)(1 ) ) (1 ) 0x px F x xσ α β σ β σ α βΨ = − − + − − − + − − >  for all 
*x  that solve equation (29). 
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Under assumption 1 the RHS is decreasing in equilibrium. Moreover, the LHS is 
steeper than the RHS in the first equilibrium. For both functions to cross a 
second time it must happen that the RHS is now steeper than the LHS. Hence, if 
the equilibrium is to be unique it cannot happen that the RHS LHS
x x
∂ ∂>∂ ∂  at any 
*x  that solves equation (29). Assumption 2 guarantees that RHS LHS
x x
∂ ∂<∂ ∂  at 
all *x . Thus, when assumption 2 holds, the symmetric equilibrium is unique. 
Assumption 2. 
1 1 1
* * 11 1 1 1
*
* (1 )1
(1 )(1 )(1 ( 1) )( )
( 1) (1 ) (1 ( 1) )
A B F x pxx
F m r F px
β α α β α β
σβ β β β
αβ
σ σ ββ
β α β σ
− − − − + −− − − −
−−
− − + −Ψ <
− + + −
 for all *x  that 
solve equation (29). 
 
To sum up, we proved that the equilibrium always exists. When (1 )α β σ> − , 
we need assumption 2 to prove that the equilibrium is unique. 
When (1 )α β σ< − , we need assumptions 1 and 2 to prove uniqueness of 
equilibrium. These assumptions were satisfied for all the simulation exercises 
performed. 
 
B. Comparative analysis with mobility costs. Analytical proofs for the 
case (1 )α β σ> − . 
In this section we provide the analytical proofs of the results of the comparative 
analysis in the case of (1 )α β σ> −  and positive mobility costs. We study how 
parameter changes affects labor mobility and experience premium in 
equilibrium. Some of the results require some assumptions to hold. All 
assumptions stated here hold in the simulation exercises of the paper. 
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B1. Results on labor mobility 
We rewrite equation (29) to have 0G LHS RHS= − =  and differentiate with 
respect to the parameter. The sign of this derivative indicates how the parameter 
affects *x . 
 
Let Δ  be the following expression: 
 
1 1 1
(1 )1 1 1 1( (1 ( 1) ) (1 ( 1) ) ) .rA B F x F px
βαα α β α β βσ σ ββ β β
β
−− − + + − + + −−− − − ⎛ ⎞+Δ = + − + − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Notice that given the restrictions assumed on the parameters of the model Δ  is 
always positive. 
Variation of  p 
 1 ( 1) ( (1 ) ) .
(1 )
G x F mx
p
σ
σ α β σ
α β σ
−∂ − − −= + Δ∂ −  
Since we consider the case of (1 )α β σ> − , it is trivial to check that this 
derivative is positive. This implies that learning-by-hiring affects positively the 
labor mobility in equilibrium. 
Variation of  m 
 1 (1 ( 1) ) 0.G F px
m
σ
α
∂ = − + − Δ <∂  
This derivative is negative, so an increase in mobility costs always results in a 
decrease in labor mobility. 
Variation of  A 
 (1 ( 1) ) 0.
(1 )
G m F px
A A
σ
β
∂ + −= Δ >∂ −  
This derivative is positive, so an increase in the learning-by-doing always results 
in larger labor mobility in equilibrium. 
Variation of  B 
 (1 ) (1 ( 1) ) 0.
(1 )
G m F px
B B
σα β
α β
∂ − − + −= Δ >∂ −  
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This derivative is positive, so an increase in the technological level always 
results in larger labor mobility in equilibrium. 
Variation of  F 
 ( ( (1 ) (1 ( 1)(1 ) ) (1 ) ) .
(1 ) (1 ( 1) )
G m px F x x
F F x
σ σ β α σ α β σ
α β σ
∂ − − + − − − − −= − Δ∂ − + −  
Since (1 )α β σ> − , it is trivial to check that this derivative is positive. Notice 
additionally that the effect on total mobility ( Fλ ) is also positive. 
Variation of σ  
 
( )
1
2
(1 ( 1) )[ ] *
(1 )
* ( 1) ( (1 ) ) [ ] (1 ( 1) ) [1 ( 1) ] .
G m F pxpx Log x
F p x Log x F px Log F px
σ
σ
σ σ σ
σ α β σ
σ α β σ α
−∂ + −= + Δ∂ −
− − − − + − + −
 
Notice that since in equilibrium *0 1x< < , then *[ ] 0Log x <  and 
*[1 ( 1) ] 0Log F px σ+ − > . Then, it is easy to check that since (1 )α β σ> −  the 
derivative has a negative sign. This means that the more substitutable are the 
different types of experienced workers, the less labor mobility there will be in 
equilibrium. 
B2. Results on experience premium 
From equations (15) and (17) we obtain: 
 (1 ( 1) ) .
(1 )(1 ( 1) )
F x
w p F xσ
ω α
α β
+ −= − − + −  (1.30) 
We use this expression together with the results on labor mobility to check how 
the experience premium depends on each parameter. 
 
Let us define 11 ( ( 1)(1 ) )px F xσ σ σ−Γ = − − − − . Hereinafter we assume that Γ  is 
positive in equilibrium. This assumption is satisfied in all the simulation 
exercises of the paper. 
Assumption 3. 
* 1 *1 ( ( 1)(1 ) ) 0px F xσ σ σ−Γ = − − − − > for all *x  that solve equation (29). 
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Variation of  p 
 2
( 1)( (1 ( 1) ) )
.
(1 )(1 ( 1) )
xF F x x
pw
p p F x
σ
σ
ω α
α β
∂− Γ − + −∂ ∂=∂ − − + −  
We showed in appendix B.1 that x
p
∂
∂  is positive. Then the effect of learning-by-
hiring on experience premium is ambiguous. When (1 ( 1) )x F x x
p
σ∂ Γ > + −∂ , then 
the learning-by-hiring affects positively the equilibrium experience premium. 
Otherwise, the effect is negative.  
Variation of  m 
 2
( 1) 0.
(1 )(1 ( 1) )
F xw
m F px mσ
ω
α
α β
∂ − Γ ∂= <∂ − − + − ∂  
This derivative is negative. Therefore, experience premium is decreasing in 
mobility costs. 
Variation of  A 
 2
( 1) 0.
(1 )(1 ( 1) )
F xw
A F px Aσ
ω
α
α β
∂ − Γ ∂= >∂ − − + − ∂  
We obtain a positive impact of learning-by-doing on experience premium. 
Variation of  B 
 2
( 1) 0.
(1 )(1 ( 1) )
F xw
B F px Bσ
ω
α
α β
∂ − Γ ∂= >∂ − − + − ∂  
We obtain a positive impact of technological level on experience premium. 
Variation of F 
 
1
2
[( 1) ( 1)]
.
(1 )(1 ( 1) )
xF x px
w F
F p F x
σ
σ
ω α
α β
−∂∂ − Γ − −∂=∂ − − + −  
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We showed in appendix B.1 that 0x
F
∂ >∂ . Then the effect of F  on experience 
premium is ambiguous. Notice that the first term in the numerator is positive. 
Recall that in equilibrium
1
1x p σ−< . Then the last term in the numerator is 
negative. For low levels of F the negative effect dominates and variety of 
knowledge affects negatively the equilibrium experience premium, while for 
high levels of F the total effect of variety of knowledge on experience premium 
is positive.  
Variation of σ  
 2
( 1)( (1 ( 1) ) [ ])
.
(1 )(1 ( 1) )
xF px F x Log x
w
p F x
σ
σ
ω α σ
σ α β
∂∂ − Γ − + −∂=∂ − − + −  
We showed in appendix B.1 that 0xσ
∂ <∂ . Then the sign of this derivative is 
ambiguous. If (1 ( 1) ) [ ] xpx F x Log xσ σ
∂+ − > Γ∂ , the elasticity of substitution 
affects positively the equilibrium experience premium. Otherwise the effect is 
negative. 
 
 
 
